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A FOOTNOTE FOR JACK DAWSON
James J. White* and David A. Peters**
Jack Dawson, known to many at Michigan as Black Jack, taught at
the Law School from 1927 to 1958. Much of his work was published in
the Michigan Law Review, where he served as a student editor during
the 1923-24 academic year. We revisit his work and provide a footnote
to his elegant writing on mistake and supervening events.
In Part I, we talk a little about Jack the man. In Part II, we recite
the nature and significance of his scholarly work. Part III deals briefly
with the cases decided in the last twenty years by American courts on
impracticability, impossibility, mistake and frustration of purpose. We
focus particularly on the afterlife of the notorious Alcoa case that was
the subject of Jack's last articles. Part IV concludes with some specula-
tion on the reasons for the different responses of German and
American courts to claims of mistake or supervening events.
I. A SPLENDID PIECE OF WORK
As a Contracts student, F1 first met Jack Dawson vicariously in the
fall of 1959. We studied contracts from Dawson and Harvey in mimeo-
graph. That Contracts casebook first brought remedies to the front of
contracts books and to the early weeks in contract courses. It so as-
serted that remedies were at least as important as any other part of
contract doctrine and more important than most.
I did not meet Jack in the flesh until almost fifteen years later when
I was a visiting Professor at Harvard. Having taught for well over a
decade at Harvard, Jack was teaching at Boston University in 1973.
On a snowy Sunday morning I was in my office at Harvard when Jack
Dawson invited me next door and, with a sly grin, pulled out a bottle
of whisky and two glasses. I think that was the most extraordinary of-
fer of a drink that I have ever had. It confirmed my fantasies about
Jack and made plausible all of the stories about his delightful eccen-
tricities. What stories could not be true of one who offers Scotch neat
at nine on Sunday morning?
* Robert A. Sullivan Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. B.A. 1956,
Amherst; J.D. 1962, University of Michigan.
** B.A. 1992, College of William and Mary; M.A. 1998, University of Chicago; J.D. (ex-
pected 2003), University of Michigan. The authors thank Professor Gareth Jones for his sug-
gestions and for providing some of the primary materials cited in this Article. - Ed.
1. "I" means White; "We" means Peters and White.
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Jack came to the faculty in 1927 and served on the faculty until
1958. Stories have it that he was offered a salary of something like
3,000 dollars when he was hired in 1927, but that the Dean shortly told
him that the school could pay only 2,000 dollars. He came anyway.
Jack's normal fare was Equity and Contracts, but he also taught Legal
History and Comparative Law.
Many legends attend Jack's time on the faculty here. One can
imagine that a Sunday morning offeror of whisky might have his no-
tions about school rules. Evidently Jack's attire once deviated so far
from the acceptable that the Dean spoke to him about it (he may have
neglected to wear a suit coat to class on a warm day). In the next class
Jack showed up in a white tie and tails. I suspect that this is merely
representative of Jack's attitude toward rules he thought to be foolish.
As a Democrat on a staunchly Republican faculty Jack was even
more deviant than a Republican is today. And Jack was not merely a
Democrat; he was a candidate for the House of Representatives on the
Democratic ticket in 1950 and 1952. It must have rankled him that
some of his colleagues signed a newspaper advertisement opposing his
election. Ann Arbor was then as Republican as it is now Democrat,
and he was never elected to office.
His closest approach to elective office was by appointment. In the
spring of 1951, Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Grand Rapids was on
his deathbed. Governor G. Mennen "Soapy" Williams, a student and
friend of Jack's,2 allegedly proposed to appoint Jack as Vandenberg's
replacement, but told Jack that it could be done only if it were done
quickly and before the influential people in the Democratic party in-
sisted otherwise.3 Supposedly Jack told the Dean and bought a blue
suit appropriate for a swearing in after speaking to Soapy. It never
happened. Whether others intervened or Soapy changed his mind
cannot be confirmed.4
He later declined an opportunity to be appointed to the Michigan
Supreme Court.5 Though Jack had served admirably as both Chief of
the Middle East division of the Foreign Economic Administration
2. See FRANK MCNAUGHTON, MENNEN WILLIAMS OF MICHIGAN: FIGHTER FOR
PROGRESS 60 (1960). After Williams's election as governor in 1950, Jack helped him put to-
gether a panel of policy advisors to craft his social programs. Id. at 139-40.
3. We are grateful to Professor Gareth Jones for confirming this anecdote. Personal
Communication with Gareth Jones, Visiting Professor, University of Michigan Law School,
in Ann Arbor, Mich. (Apr. 30, 2002) [hereinafter Personal Communication with Professor
Jones (Apr. 30, 2002)].
4. Ultimately, the position went to Blair Moody, a prominent journalist for the Detroit
News. See Vandenberg's Successor, TIME, Apr. 30, 1951, at 22 (suggesting that union pres-
sure and a desire to promote Williams's national ambitions contributed to the appointment
of Moody). Despite Moody's name recognition, however, he lost his bid for re-election dur-
ing the 1952 Eisenhower landslide. HELEN WASHBURN BERTHELOT, WIN SOME, LOSE
SOME: G. MENNEN WILLIAMS AND THE NEW DEMOCRATS 119 (1995).
5. John Philip Dawson 1902-1985, HARV. L. SCHOOL BULL. 36, 37 (1986).
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during World War II and later as an advisor to the Greek government
as a representative of the Foreign Trade Administration, "to him,
there was nothing like the classroom."
6
Jack was early and always a serious scholar. His first publication in
the Review must have been the product of his research in England
where he studied as a Rhodes scholar. Even in his post retirement
service at Boston University, he continued to write. By today's stan-
dards, and even more by the standards of the time, he was prolific. By
any standard his writing and thinking were powerful. Jack's writing
was always felicitous and, as his writing about Alcoa shows, it was in-
formed by a passion.
Jack Dawson was not only a fine and rigorous teacher and scholar,
he was also a politician, a teaching innovator, a fine colleague, and,
best of all, a judge of fine whisky.
II. JACK DAWSON THE SCHOLAR
As a scholar, Jack Dawson was a man ahead of his times. A
Rhodes scholar after he graduated from Michigan Law School, he
earned his D.Phil. from Oxford before returning to Michigan to teach.7
These days, elite law faculties overflow with multiple degrees, but in
1931 a law professor with a doctorate was a rare bird. His interest in
the law did not end at the water's edge, nor did he limit himself to the
legal world of the English-speaking peoples; from the very first, his ar-
ticles reflected a knowledge of both German and French law.' Dawson
was also willing to travel into the past to explore the roots of modern
doctrine and draw on history to provide lessons for contemporary law.9
6. Id.
7. For those interested in Jack's scholarly genealogy, he studied with Sir Paul
Vinogradoff, whose own work covered much the same intellectual terrain as Jack's. . Per-
sonal Communication with Professor Jones (Apr. 30, 2002). We thank Professor Gareth
Jones for this insight.
8. See, e.g., John P. Dawson, Effects of Inflation on Private Contracts: Germany, 1914-
1924, 33 MICH. L. REV. 171 (1934) [hereinafter Dawson, Effects of Inflation in Germany].
For a list of most (though not all) of Dawson's publications, see Appendix: The Writings of
John Philip Dawson, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1126 (1986) [hereinafter Appendix]. His most impor-
tant work, JOHN P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW (1968), based on the Cooley lec-
tures he gave in Ann Arbor in 1959, distills his knowledge of European law, tracing Roman,
French and German law and comparing them to the Common Law tradition. An impressive
piece of legal history, it also reflects Dawson's understanding of the craft of judging and the
ways in which tradition disciplines the judicial process. His other books often drew on com-
parative law to explore the ways in which different systems addressed similar problems. See,
e.g., JOHN P. DAWSON, A HISTORY OF LAY JUDGES (1960); JOHN P. DAWSON, GIFTS AND
PROMISES: CONTINENTAL AND AMERICAN LAW COMPARED (1980); JOHN P. DAWSON,
UNJUST ENRICHMENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1951).
9. See, e.g., John P. Dawson & Frank E. Cooper, The Effect of Inflation on Private Con-
tracts: United States, 1861-1879 (pts. 1 & 2), 33 MICH. L. REV. 706, 852 (1935) [hereinafter
Dawson, Effects of Inflation in the United States]; John P. Dawson, Coke and Ellesmere Dis-
interred: An Attack on the Chancery in 1616, 36 U. ILL. L. REV. 127 (1941); John P. Dawson,
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In an era when professors might publish only a few articles during a
career, the quantity of Jack Dawson's publications is all the more im-
pressive.1" In many of these articles, with their historical depth and
transnational breadth, an underlying question recurs: when and to
what extent should judges do more than award damages in contract
disputes?
Answering this question took Jack into a number of different areas
in the law. In an early work, he explored estoppel and its relation to
statutes of limitation.11 He maintained that though the law could allow
parties to contract away their rights under statutes of limitations, it
should be willing to step in when one of the parties sought to abuse its
rights under the contract. The courts should step in to help parties
whose good faith attempts to resolve disputes amicably were repaid by
knavery.12 From estoppel he moved on to mistake, arguing that rescis-
sion or reform of a contract for mistake was the "enforcement of an
intention defectively expressed."'3 He noted that while courts need not
necessarily enforce statutes of limitations to bar remedies for mistake,
the longer an agreement continues (or the longer the period since
value changed hands), the more a claim of mistake begins to look like
a case of buyer's remorse."'
Dawson's interest in remedies was a product of his focus on the
various ways in which parties sought the upper hand in contracting
through the exertion of economic power. The mid-1930s was not too
far removed from the heyday of doctrinal freedom of contract made so
infamous in Lochner. For Dawson (and many of his peers), the ques-
tion became how best to move from a "world of fantasy, too orderly,
too neatly contrived, and too harmonious to correspond to reality,"15
towards a realm of contract law that could control the worst abuses of
economic power. As any first-year contract student learns, duress
emerged from the Roman conception of laesio enormis, and Dawson
followed the development of that idea from Rome through medieval
Christendom to its fruition in modern French and German law in the
The Privy Council and Private Law in the Tudor and Stuart Periods (pts. 1 & 2), 48 MICH. L.
REV. 393,627 (1950).
10. The Harvard Law Review lists some thirty-one articles along with eleven books. See
Appendix, supra note 8, at 1126-27.
11. John P. Dawson, Estoppel and Statutes of Limitation, 34 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1935).
12. Id. at 14.
13. John P. Dawson, Mistake and Statutes of Limitations, 20 MINN. L. REV. 481, 486
(1936).
14. Id. at 487. ("The longer these [justifiable] expectations have existed unchallenged,
the more entitled they should be to judicial protection.").
15. John P. Dawson, Economic Duress and the Fair Exchange in French and German
Law (pt. 1), 11 TUL. L. REV. 345,345 (1937).
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early nineteenth century. 6 He rooted his understanding of modern du-
ress in Christian condemnation of usury but noted that usury, with its
blanket condemnation of interest, was an easier standard to apply than
judicial investigation of the discrete circumstances of a single inequita-
ble bargain. 7 His. comparative study of French and German doctrine
introduced not only the historical antecedents of the doctrine, but of-
fered a comparative analysis of the pitfalls of too broad a vision of du-
ress.
18
Moving from the European to the American context, after World
War II Dawson wrote a body of seminal work on duress in the United
States, all published in the Michigan Law Review. In the first piece, he
traced the historical evolution of the concept of duress, observing that
what had come to be considered a full-fledged doctrine was in reality a
reflection of, "the convergence of several lines of growth .... [The re-
sult of which] has certainly not been a coherent body of doctrine, uni-
fied around some central proposition; on the contrary, the conflict and
confusion in results of decided cases seem greater than ever before."19
He sought to instill order into a morass of doctrine by distilling
from it, in the style of American Legal Realism, some core notion
open to broad application. Looking into the tort roots of duress,
Dawson found that contemporary economic duress focused upon,
"situations in which an unequal exchange of values has been coerced
by taking advantage of a superior bargaining position."2 This insight
permitted him to assert that a more expansive notion of duress was
consonant with the policing function of the courts, providing judges a
legitimate way to intervene in private bargains to shore up the founda-
tions of a market society.2
This vision of state as impartial policeman led him to discuss litiga-
tion as a form of duress.22 Although Dawson recognized the right of
parties to seek redress in court, he also observed that, "[t]he sanctions
of civil procedure constitute a system of state-organized coercion, sup-
plied to private individuals for the specific purpose of enabling them to
16. Id. at 364-76.
17. John P. Dawson, Economic Duress and the Fair Exchange in French and German
Law (pt. 2), 12 TUL. L. REV. 42,45 (1937).
18. Id. at 61 ("[T]he experience of German courts with processes of valuation amply re-
veals the manifold difficulties in judicial determination of a 'just price'. . . . Nevertheless,
these difficulties, when seen and fully understood, do not prove insurmountable.").
19. John P. Dawson, Economic Duress - An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REV.
253, 288 (1947).
20. Id. at 285.
21. See id. at 281.




effectuate their demands. '23 Though in mid-century America criminal
law was no longer a legitimate means of encouraging recalcitrant
debtors to pay up, Dawson was troubled by the ability of parties to use
the threat of civil litigation as a tool for obtaining more in private set-
tlement than they would otherwise realize in the courts. 24 This concern
with duress was in part motivated by a genuine fear of the ability of
parties with superior bargaining power to shift the burdens of risk and
uncertainty onto the weak.2 1 Jack found the idea that the state as neu-
tral policeman should intervene to grant the strong the benefit of un-
foreseen circumstances too much to stomach.
This solicitude for the weak and desire to ferret out the true basis
of every bargain informed the other major strand of Dawson's re-
search. From the first, he was interested in the impact of inflation
upon the law of contracts. As a Rhodes Scholar in the mid-1920s, he
had a ringside seat for the hyper-inflation that destroyed the German
middle-class and set the stage for the rise of Hitler. His very first pub-
lications in the Michigan Law Review investigated judicial attempts to
reform contracts in the face of inflation.26 Looking at the German
courts in the period from 1915-24, he concluded that they had done
everything in their power to ameliorate the impact of inflation, failing
only when the German economic system finally collapsed completely.
Moreover, he noted that the judicial experiments in stemming infla-
tion helped guide legislative responses to the crisis. 28 He also studied
American history during the Civil War period in an effort to glean
from it some insight into the proper judicial role in curbing the impact
of inflation on contracting parties. 29 Distinguishing the hyperinflation
of the Confederate and Weimar periods from less dramatic instances
of monetary depreciation, he recognized the importance of inflation as
a policy tool that could be used as a means of debt relief (a significant
issue if you consider that he was writing in 1935). 3 Thus, judicial inter-
vention that might be warranted in a period of excessive inflation
might, if inflation were moderate, be an impediment to effective leg-
islative or administrative policy.31 Because judicial remedies for infla-
tion undermine the "security of transaction" necessary to the legiti-
macy of the contract system, judges should refrain from intervening
23. Id. at 573.
24. Id. at 577.
25. Id. at 687-93.
26. Dawson, Effects of Inflation in Germany, supra note 8.
27. Id. at 238.
28. Id. at 219-36.
29. Dawson, Effects of Inflation in the United States, supra note 9.
30. Id. at 909.
31. Id. at 912.
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unless "the influence on prices of purely monetary factors [emerges] as
a factor independent of ordinary influences of supply and demand."32
Jack's work did not end with his exploration of the substantive law,
however. He was also keenly interested in the craft of judging and the
development of the role of the judge over time. His History of Lay
Judges33 investigates the (to the contemporary observer) curious tradi-
tion of lay judges in Western legal systems. In pre-modern societies,
lacking a clearly expressed vision of separation of powers, "it was
common to fuse with dispute-settlement some rule-making and execu-
tive functions."34 The overlapping functions of those entrusted with
settling social disputes meant that there was less demand for officials
whose sole function was the definition and application of the law.
Though increasingly complex societies demand greater specialization,
a residual interest in ensuring the legitimacy of law through popular
participation in part explains the continued vitality of lay participation
in the judicial process. That lay participation also permits the court to
draw on the expertise of others in making its decisions, based on, "an
assumption that law is better administered if it draws on the good
sense and practical wisdom of persons in whom these qualities have
not been severely warped by excessive exposure to the law."36 The
warping effects of a legal education aside, Jack pointed out that the es-
sence of judging lies in the legitimacy of the process as well as the effi-
cacy of the decisions that emerge from it.
Though much of Jack's work was ground-breaking, his magnum
opus was Oracles of the Law.37 Turning his attention from lay judges to
the history of the professional judiciary and its role in the case law sys-
tem, he emphasized the "creative role of adjudication."38 While the
primary role of judicial process, particularly in earlier periods, was the
peaceful resolution of social conflict "conflict itself, though potentially
dangerous, is a major source of growth and change."39 For Jack, an in-
creased separation of judicial from administrative and legislative func-
tions still "requires the legal order to take account of new values and
human needs that in society as in our private lives conflict can be crea-
tive."4 This creativity, however, had its limits; turning his comparativ-
ist's eye on France, Jack argued that when the French courts exceeded
32. Id. at 913.
33. See supra note 8.
34. Id. at 1.
35. See id. at 288-91.
36. Id. at 293.
37. JOHN P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW (1968).





their powers (even in the cause of opposition to authoritarianism) they
provoked a political reaction that sought to rein in the power of the
judges. 1
If for Jack judges could undermine themselves by being on the one
hand too timid to apply their creative powers to new situations and on
the other too bold in the incursions upon the realm of the political,
where did the happy medium lie? Ultimately, he found it in Rome.
The extraordinary achievement of the Roman jurists owed much, it
seems, to their own self-imposed limitations. They were conservatives
and traditionalists, with profound respect for the inherited tools of their
craft. Through the conflicts of opinion that were numerous among them
they perfected these tools and used them with increasing precision ....
Most of. their attention was directed, not to theoretical synthesis, but to
the consistent and orderly treatment of individual cases .... Their as-
sumptions were fixed, the main purposes of the social and political order
were not to be called in question, the system of legal ideas was too well
known to require much discussion. They were problem-solvers, working
within this system and not called upon to solve the ultimate problems of
mankind's needs and destiny. They work case by case, with patience and
acumen and profound respect for inherited tradition. Despite the long
centuries that have intervened, despite our vastly different hopes for
mankind and its future, we in the twentieth century can still profit from
their work. Those who should feel the strongest affinity for them are per-
sons trained in American case law.
2
Taking nothing away from the wisdom and intelligence of modern
judges, Jack recognized that they stand on the shoulders of giants.
Moreover, the range of issues they have to deal with include matters
far outside their ken; better to defer to tradition, precedent, and the
knowledge of experts.
In his last major scholarly publication, Jack revisited the question
of inflation and frustration of contract, this time in the context of the
Alcoa case;43 he brought to bear both his knowledge of substantive law
and his vision of the proper role of the judge in rebuking the judge for
overstepping the bounds of prudence and the law.
The facts of Alcoa are, for the 1970s, not particularly unusual. In
the mid-1960s, Essex Wire decided to increase its production of alumi-
num wire products." In the spring of 1967, Alcoa and Essex Wire en-
tered into a contract that provided for Essex wire to supply Alcoa with
alumina which Alcoa would then smelt into [aluminum]."45 The price
41. Id. at 370-71.
42. Id. at 114-15.
43. Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980). See
generally, John P. Dawson, Judicial Revision of Frustrated Contracts: The United States, 64
B.U. L. REV. 1 (1984) [hereinafter Judicial Revision in the United States].
44. Alcoa, 499 F. Supp. at 55.
45. Id. at 56.
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clauses of the contract included an escalator clause providing for
changes in price based on both the Wholesale Price Index ("WPI")
and the average labor wages of Alcoa employees at the plant in which
the smelting was done.46 As a result of the 1973 OPEC oil embargo,
however, the price of oil-fired electricity (the single largest non-labor
cost factor in aluminum conversion) rose dramatically and, "[a]s a re-
sult, [Alcoa's] production costs rose greatly and unforeseeably beyond
the indexed increase in the contract price. 4 7 In the face of this infla-
tion and a loss on the contract in 1978 (the last year of performance
before the suit) of over eight million dollars, Alcoa sought reformation
of the contract on the grounds of mistake, frustration, and impractica-
bility.
48
Finding in favor of Alcoa, Judge Teitelbaum reasoned that the par-
ties had in fact made a mutual mistake of fact by agreeing that the
WPI indexing formula would prove suitable to meet their expecta-
tions.49 On the same facts, the court held that Alcoa had also proved its
case with regard to frustration and impracticability." In fashioning a
remedy, however, the judge threw caution to the wind. 1 Reasoning
that "[tihis case is novel," the court was willing to impose its remedy
out of fear that parties might otherwise refuse to enter into long-term
contracts. 2 The court rejected "the hoary maxim that the courts will
not make a contract for the parties."53 Reasoning that "in this dispute
the Court has information from hindsight far superior to that which
the parties had when they made their contract," Judge Teitelbaum
concluded that, "the parties may both be better served by an informed
judicial decision based on the known circumstances than by a decision
wrenched from words of the contract which were not chosen with a
46. Id. Alcoa developed its indexing system with the aid of now-Federal Reserve
Chairman Alan Greenspan. Id. at 58.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 59. Interestingly, Alcoa had to that point made a net profit of nine million
dollars on the contract (inclusive of its losses). Id. at 65-66.
49. Id. at 63 ("Both [parties] knew that Essex sought an objective pricing formula and
that [Alcoa] sought a formula which would cover its out of pocket costs over the years and
which would yield it a return of around four cents a pound .... The testimony was clear that
each assumed the Index was adequate to fulfill it purpose. This mistaken assumption was
essentially a present actuarial error.").
50. Id. at 72.
51. See id. at 80. The Court imposed a new scheme that made the contract price the
lesser of either 1) the contract ceiling price as calculated under the original indexing clause
or 2) the greater of either that contract price calculated according to the terms of the con-
tract or "that price which yields [Alcoa] a profit of one cent per pound of aluminum con-
verted." Id.
52. Id. at 89.
53. Id. at 91.
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prevision of today's circumstances."54 His later observation that, "[t]he
Court gladly concedes that the parties might today evolve a better
working arrangement by negotiation than the Court can impose,"55
proved far more prescient; Alcoa and Essex Wire settled before the
case was heard on appeal. 6
In analyzing Alcoa, Jack drew on his comparative study of the
German legal system,57 this time as an example of what not to do in
providing a remedy. 8 He claimed that the Alcoa court, in trying to
solve the contract problem posed by the inflation of the mid-1970s,
had violated three basic precepts of contract. First, the judge inter-
vened not to provide a remedy for past injustice, but to impose a pro-
spective solution upon the parties that failed to give form to their
original intent. 9 Second, the judge, in fashioning this relief, gave the
parties a club with which to bash one another until they came to terms
on their own. 6' Third, such drastic judicial intervention in the con-
tracting process both undermines public faith in the legal system and
absolves the parties of any responsibility to negotiate over risks that
are predictable but the exact impact of which is unforeseeable.6 In
Dawson's view, parties should be forced to take account of all but the
most extreme inflation, and even in those cases, remedies should be
limited to returning the injured party to the status ex ante facto.
III. AFTER ALCOA
In his article about the postwar German experience with impracti-
cability, frustration, mistake and the like, Jack criticizes the German
courts for so freely rewriting contracts that had failed because of mis-
take or changed circumstances. 62 In his first Boston article he traces
the German courts' reaction to the contract dislocations that attended
the astronomical inflation suffered by the Germans after World War
1.63 He notes how the German courts, behaving like extremely naughty
common law courts, began to free parties from contracts because of
54. Id. at 91.
55. Id.
56. Dawson, Judicial Revision in the United States, supra note 43, at 28.
57. John P. Dawson, Judicial Revision of Frustrated Contracts: Germany, 63 B.U. L.
REV. 1039 (1983) [hereinafter Dawson, Judicial Revision in Germany].
58. Dawson, Judicial Revision in the United States, supra note 43, at 29.
59. Id. at 27.
60. Id. at 28. This is reminiscent of Dawson's discussion of duress in civil litigation, and
makes the court almost an active participant in that part of the process.
61. Id. at 33.
62. Dawson, Judicial Revision in Germany, supra note 57.
63. See generally Dawson, Effects of Inflation in Germany, supra note 8.
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supervening causes, despite the conscious and severe restrictions in the
German Code of 1900 on freeing parties from their contracts on such
grounds.64
In one of the early German cases a seller had contracted in 1921 to
sell iron bars and to deliver half of them in 1922.65 When the seller
failed to deliver, the buyer sued for specific performance in return for
his payment of the original contract price in marks. By the time the
case came before the appellate court in 1924, the buyer's entire pay-
ment would have been worth less than a penny. Accordingly the court
ordered the contract "revalorized" (i.e., ordered the lower court to re-
quire the buyer to pay something that was roughly equivalent to the
value of the iron at the time of delivery).66 This case and many more
like it were still fresh in the minds of judges and lawyers after World
War II.
The same kind of inflation that followed the First did not follow
the Second World War; instead, Anglo-American bombing, the Allied
conquest, and the sticky fingers of the Russians nearly ruined the
German economy. Jack tells of an early postwar case that set the tone
for contract revisions. In that case, two buyers had made down pay-
ments on Volkswagens in 1938 or 1939. Urged on by one of Hitler's
dreams, they and more than 300,000 other Germans had paid more
than 250 million marks to the company that was to manufacture the
peoples' car.67 Part of that money had been used to build a plant to
manufacture the Volkswagen. The factory was taken over for the war
effort, mostly destroyed by American -bombing, and the Russians ex-
propriated the trust account that contained all of the down payments
that had not been used to build the plant. When it became clear that a
postwar Volkswagen would cost 4,400 marks, not the contracted 990,
and that the remaining down payments had been expropriated and the
plant destroyed, one might have expected the court to turn the plain-
tiffs away. It did not. The high court agreed with both parties that the
"foundations" of these contracts had been "destroyed," but instead of
avoiding the contracts the court sent the case back to the lower court
to determine how many of the 300,000 potential plaintiffs could still
pay or wanted Volkswagens and what they should now pay - in addi-
tion to their down payments. Despite the multiple problems associated
with 300,000 different potential plaintiffs (some of whom wanted a car
and some who did not), the need to set a new price for the contracts
and to apportion the loss of the trust funds, the lower court was to re-
write and then enforce the rewritten contracts.
64. Id. at 1041-70.
65. Id. at 1060.
66. Id.
67. For a discussion of the Volkswagen case, see id. at 1083-87.
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Following the Volkswagen case, it must have seemed child's play to
rewrite other contracts that had only two parties and called merely for
setting proper mortgage payments or adjusting sales prices. Shortly,
German judges and litigants accepted revision of contracts as a con-
ventional remedy.' Jack concludes his summary of the German expe-
rience with this dismal description:
[I]t seems plain that from every point of view court-ordered 'adjustment'
of frustrated contracts, as it has now been established in Germany, is a
major impairment of freedom of contract, carried into areas for which, by
hypothesis, the contracting parties did not provide and in which uninhibi-
ted freedom is more than usually needed."'6 9
Jack commends one German scholar's "rear guard action" against an
enemy when the "main battle was lost more than fifty years ago."7°
The Germans remembered too well their appropriate rewriting of con-
tracts in response to the inflation of the 1920s and applied too readily
to the different issues of the 1950s.
A. Alcoa
Jack's discussion of Alcoa7 is even sharper.7 2 He notes that the par-
ties had negotiated an elaborate escalation clause and that the case
was hardly one of mistake - despite the judge's asserting to the con-
trary. But he was most offended by the judge's claim to have the
power and knowledge not merely to avoid the contract but to draft a
new and elaborate contract for the remaining seven years of the Essex-
Alcoa deal. The professorial advocates of Alcoa's approach get a small
share of Jack's anger.73
His unhappiness with Alcoa arises from the fear that other courts,
encouraged by such a prominent decision and by the professors' in-
dorsement,74 would not only enlarge the grounds for avoidance of con-
68. Id. at 1087.
69. Id. at 1089 (emphasis in original).
70. Id. at 1098. Jack was generally an admirer of the German legal system; even here, he
identified a number of scholars who took issue with the German Courts' treatment of infla-
tion in the post World War II period. See id. at 1096-98.
71. Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
72. See generally Dawson, Judicial Revision in the United States, supra note 43.
73. See id. at 28-30. Dawson critically mentions Richard Speidel, Court-Imposed Price
Adjustments Under Long-Term Supply Contracts, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 369 (1981); Michael N.
Zundel, Comment, Equitable Reformation of Long-Term Contracts - The "New Spirit" of
ALCOA, 1982 UTAH L. REV. 985; and Note, U.C.C. § 2-615: Excusing the Impracticable, 60
B.U. L. REV. 575 (1980).
74. Dawson, Judicial Revision in the United States, supra note 43, at 31 ("The trouble-
some question for me at least, is - how far would the Alcoa case and the glosses like this




tracts but also embrace Judge Teitelbaum's claim that courts can and
should fashion new contract terms for the remaining periods in con-
tracts that had not yet expired when suit was filed. Undoubtedly Jack's
fears were fed by his knowledge of the German cases which he had
studied in the 1930s and again in the 1980s. If the intellectual German
judges, trained in a civil law and members of a society famous for its
strict obedience to rules could ignore the directions of their Code and
so easily slip down the slope of contract revision, surely the Americans
who cared less for rules and were not bound by a Code would slip
quicker and fartherY
He was wrong. American courts have not only refused to rewrite
contracts, they appear to have held the line at avoiding them. The de-
cisions of the last twenty years show Jack's fears to have been ill
founded.
B. American Cases After Alcoa
Since Alcoa there have been several disruptions of commodity
markets that have given the courts hundreds of opportunities to hear
parties' pleas to be freed from contract obligations because of mistake
or supervening causes. Alcoa itself arose out of an increase in electric-
ity rates that was caused by the rise in oil process after the Arab oil
embargo.76 It was preceded by the Uranium bubble that was ended by
the accident at Three Mile Island and followed by disruptions in the
markets for natural gas, coal, and electricity.
The disruption in the natural gas markets was a direct result of
government regulation of that market.77 In 1970, the Congress passed
the Economic Stabilization Act.78 That Act fixed prices for gas sold in
75. Id. at 1-2.
76. Id. at 26-27.
77. Regulation over pipelines was established by the Natural Gas Act ("NGA") of 1938.
In 1954 the Supreme Court in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954), con-
strued the NGA to give the Federal Power Commission authority over gas producers. See
David Crump, Natural Gas Price Escalation Clauses: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 70
MINN. L. REV. 61 (1985); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Natural Gas Regulation, Deregulation and
Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 63, 64 (1982) (showing ways in which gas regulation, phased de-
regulation and long-term contracts interact for "results that are both inequitable and ineffi-
cient"); Susan Morris, Comment, Gas Purchase Contracts: Equitable Remedies For Breach,
24 HOUS. L. REV. 991, 996 (1987); see also Koch Hydrocarbon Co. v. MDU Resources
Group, Inc., 988 F.2d 1529, 1532, 1532 n.3 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting deregulatory effects exac-
erbated by party overreaching and breach of contract causing a "confusing morass").
78. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1904 (Supp. 1971) which codified Title II of Pub. L. 91-379, Aug.
15, 1970, 84 Stat. 799, as amended, "known as the 'Economic Stabilization Act of 1970',
authorized the President, within an established procedural framework, to stabilize prices,
rents, wages, salaries, interest rates, dividends and similar transfers, and establish priorities
for use and allocation of supplies of petroleum products, including crude oil, and to issue
standards to serve as a guide for determining levels of wages, prices, etc., which would allow
for adjustments, exceptions and variations to prevent inequities, taking into account changes
in productivity, cost of living and other pertinent factors."
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the interstate market.79 Because the fixed prices did not justify explo-
ration for and development of sufficient gas reserves to satisfy de-
mand" the controls shortly led to shortages" and, in some cases, to
threats by public officials in the Midwest and East to punish the gas
pipelines if they did not provide enough natural gas to heat hospitals
and schools.8 2 The market was also distorted by the fact the intrastate
gas was not controlled,83 so it was in the interest of producers to sell at
free market prices into the local market.'
When the gas controls were lifted over a phased period by new
legislation,85 pipeline buyers agreed to buy gas in long-term contracts
at what proved to be improvidently high prices.86 When the market es-
caped entirely from the price controls and particularly when the Fed-
eral Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") released utility buyers
from their long-term contracts, 87 the pipelines had long-term high cost
contracts to purchase gas but no long-term buyers for the high priced
gas so purchased. Those circumstances caused Columbia Gas to file
bankruptcy in order to escape more than 4,000 long-term gas purchase
79. The Economic Stabilization Act instituted price controls over a number of subjects
(rent, wages, etc.), including commodities. For natural gas, the ESA worked in conjunction
with the Natural Gas Act of 1938 as amended. 15 U.S.C.A. § 717-717w (1976).
80. Gary D. Allison, Energy Sectionalism: Economic Origins And Legal Responses, 38
SW. L.J. 703, 714 n.41 (1984) (noting that the 1978 Natural Gas Policy Act established higher
price ceilings for 'newer' gas).
81. Professor Richard Pierce reports that "[rieserves declined from 198.1 trillion cubic
feet in 1967 to 134.3 trillion cubic feet in 1973" and by 1977 the shortfall grew to 26.2% from
3.4%. Richard Pierce, Natural Gas Regulation, Deregulation and Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV.
63 n.18 (1982).
82. See James J. White, Gas Sale Contracts Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 47
INST. ON OIL & GAS L.& TAX'N § 9.01, § 9.02 (1996).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 717(c) (2000).
84. Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 414 n.19
(1983) (citing a Federal Trade Commission Staff Report).
85. The new legislation was the National Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-621, Title I,
Repealed by Pub. L. 101-60, § 2(b), July 26, 1989; see also Texaco Inc. v. Duhe, 274 F.3d 911
(5th Cir. 2001). See generally J. David Hughes, Indefinite Escalators: 1985 Does FERC Have
a 'Stairway' Down?, 4 ENERGY L.J. 189, 190 (1983).
86. See Consol. Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. F.E.R.C., 823 F.2d 630, 640 n.13 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (litigation rising from FERC's market manipulations intended to alleviate the
high-cost of take-or-pay contracts once supplies became plentiful).
87. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") Order No. 380 effective June 1,
1985. But see Atd. Richfield Co. v. ANR Pipeline Co., 768 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. App 1989) (re-
lieving pipeline company of take-or-pay obligations under force majeure clause where cus-
tomers were released from obligations by FERC Order 380); see also Order No. 436, Regula-
tion of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 18 C.F.R. §§ 2, 157, 250,
284, 375, 381 (1985); Order No. 500, Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Well-
head Decontrol, 18 C.F.R. §§ 2, 284 (1987); Order No. 636, Pipeline Service Obligations and
Revisions to Regulations Governing Self-Implementing Transportation; and Regulation of
Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 18 C.F.R. § 284 (1992).
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contracts at prices that far exceeded the free market price.8" These cir-
cumstances also caused many buyers to breach their "take or pay" ob-
ligations and resulted in lawsuits all over the West.89
The abrupt end to the licensing of new nuclear plants, the shortage
of natural gas and the rise in oil prices made utilities turn back to coal
for generating electricity.90 The environmental risks from soft eastern
coal made utilities use low sulfur western coal. Now well aware of the
risks of under-pricing a commodity in a long-term contract, coal sellers
seem to have achieved escalation clauses that caused the price of west-
ern coal in those contracts to rise well above the short-term market
price. This caused buyers to make a series of fruitless challenges to
their contracts.
The contracts for the long-term sale of electricity that were made
by California, and perhaps by other western buyers, in the summer of
2001 have yet to yield their judicial fruit, but one can be sure that the
fruit is in the bud.91 In the fall of 2001 California was reported to be
88. In re Columbia Gas Sys. Inc., 997 F.2d 1039, 1052 (3rd Cir. 1993).
89. See J. Michael Medina et al., Take or Litigate: Enforcing the Plain Meaning of the
Take-or-Pay Clause in Natural Gas Contracts, 40 ARK. L. REV. 185, 187-92 (1987).
90. This trend was boosted by Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-319, 88 Stat. 246 (1974), which mandated that "the oil- and gas-burning
electric utilities of the nation would, where feasible, have to convert to the use of coal."
Robert Meltz, The Eseca Coal Conversion Program: Saving Oil The Hard Way, 5 ENVTL. L.
REP. 50146 (1975); see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Regulatory Treatment Of Mistakes In
Retrospect: Canceled Plants And Excess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 497 (1984); Mark Siev-
ers, An Economic Analysis Of Utility-Coal Company Relationships, 8 J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y
27 (1987); Michael Evan Stern & Margaret M. Mlynczak Stern, A Critical Overview Of The
Economic And Environmental Consequences Of The Deregulation Of The U.S. Electric
Power Industry, 4 ENVTL. LAW. 79, 86 (1997); Joseph P. Tomain, Electricity Restructuring: A
Case Study In Government Regulation, 33 TULSA L.J. 827 (1998); Joseph P. Tomain, Focus
On Natural Resources Theory The Dominant Model Of United States Energy Policy, 61 U.
COLO. L. REV. 355 (1990) (a 100-year history of U.S. energy policy); Brent L. Vanderlinden,
Note, Bidding Farewell To The Social Costs Of Electricity Production: Pricing Alternative
Energy Under The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, 13 J. CORP. L. 1011, 1015 (1988);
Note, Captive Coal Pricing And The Regulation Of Utility-Affiliate Transactions, 68 VA. L.
REV. 1409,1415 n.31 (1982).
91. In 1996 California Governor Republican Pete Wilson deregulated electricity whole-
sale prices but retained caps on retail prices. When the wholesale prices skyrocketed, yet re-
tail prices could not be raised, electrical companies went so close to bankruptcy that out-of-
state sellers refused to sell on credit. Governor Gray Davis then spent $6.2 billion, most if it
from the general fund, in the period from January to May of 2001, and in June borrowed $4.2
billion more. By July, the State had negotiated thirty-eight long-term contracts worth $43
billion over ten years with suppliers; and wholesale prices then plunged. This prompted
"buyers remorse" with the expected amount of finger pointing and demands that the con-
tracts be renegotiated, or breached and damages paid. To avoid insolvency, California is
trying to float a $13.2 billion dollar bond so there is money to pay for hospitals and schools,
yet critics charge the bond does nothing to get California out from under the long-term con-
tracts. Gray Davis claims that signing the long-term contracts is the act that drove the spot-
market down. See Mitchel Benson, California Controller Is Raising Concerns On Big Bond
Sale, WALL ST. J., May 24, 2001, at A12; A.G. Block, If Davis Fails, Bush May Be White
Knight, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2001, at M1; Dan Morain, Concern Over Price of Long-Term
Power Pacts Grows Embedded Costs May Yield More Rate Hikes, Critics Say, and the $43-
Billion Total Could Complicate Plans to Rescue Edison, L.A. TIMES, July 9, 2001, at B7;
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selling electricity on the spot market at as little as one dollar per
megawatt-hour that it had bought in long-term contracts for an aver-
age of $290 per megawatt-hour. With that kind of discrepancy between
long-term prices and spot prices, litigation cannot be far behind.92
Added to the cases from contracts between buyers and sellers of
commodities in long-term contracts are the mine-run real estate lease
cases.93 These, of course, have been around for more than a century,
but they too offer possibilities for a court to free one of the parties
from his lease because of unexpected circumstances.
So, have the courts gone soft, as Jack feared? We do not think they
have. Of course, the legal doctrines have hardly changed at all. We re-
ceived the doctrines of mistake, impossibility and frustration long ago
from 19th century English law. The Restatement, 94 Article 2 of the
UCC,95 and our case law have expanded impossibility into impractica-
bility, but there has been little other change in the law as written.96
George Skelton, Davis' Critics Should Wake Up, Smell the Kilowatts, L.A. TIMES, June 21,
2001, at B8.
92. California and electricity sellers are already in arbitration over the long-term con-
tracts. Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar; Dan Morain, Davis Open to Noncash Ways to Repay State
for Overcharges Energy, L.A. TIMES, July 7, 2001, at A13. California renegotiated its long-
term contracts with power suppliers in exchange for settling market-manipulation suits it was
pursuing against those suppliers, Calpine and Constellation. Power Plays Energise Electricity
Industry, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2002, at 24. Obviously, state governments (particularly one as
large as California) have more arrows in their quiver than private actors; recent revelations
about market manipulations by Enron and others suggest that a certain amount of reregula-
tion may be in the offing. See James Flanigan, Regulation, the Cure for Energy Ills, is Com-
ing, L.A. TIMES, May 12, 2002, Pt. 3, at 1.
93. See, e.g., Freidco of Wilmington, Ltd. v. Farmers Bank of Del., 529 F. Supp. 822, 830
n.9 (D. Del. 1981) (in a case regarding a private lease, the lessor demanded that the court
eliminate a price cap because the 1970s oil embargo had driven the cost of utilities for a
commercial building far above the cap. While the court refused plaintiff's demand on failure
to prove impracticability, it noted in footnote nine that it certainly had the authority for this
remedy); George Backer Mgmt. Corp. v. Acme Quilting Co., Inc., 385 N.E.2d 1062, 1066
(N.Y. 1978) (rent escalation clause tied to tenants income).
94. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 11, Reporter's Note states:
This Chapter... adopts the central notion of Uniform Commercial Code s 2-615 of 'a con-
tingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was
made' in dealing with both impracticability and frustration. As to the former, it substitutes
the term 'impracticability' for 'impossibility' as better expressing the extent of the increased
burden that is required.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 11 (261) deals with Impracticability in general
arising after contract formation. § 11 (262-64) define three specific fact circumstances: Death
Or Incapacity Of Person Necessary For Performance, Destruction, Deterioration Or Failure
To Come Into Existence Of Thing Necessary For Performance,' and Prevention By Govern-
mental Regulation Or Order, respectively. Section 11(266(1)) deals with impracticability ex-
isting at the time of contracting:
Where, at the time a contract is made, a party's performance under it is impracticable with-
out his fault because of a fact of which he has no reason to know and the non-existence of
which is a basic assumption on which the contract is made, no duty to render that perform-
ance arises, unless the language or circumstances indicate the contrary.
95. See Article 2-615(a), which states:
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Of course, the law written is seldom the law applied. And any
reader of a few cases on mistake or supervening causes appreciates
how sloppy the standards on what is a sufficient mistake, an adequate
frustration, or a large enough impracticability to void a contract really
are. One man's frustration is another's hard bargain. Without a more
extensive reading of the cases than we have had time to do, one cannot
be sure that the practice is the same as before Alcoa, but we see no
evidence of any general willingness to void contracts that would have
been enforced before Alcoa.97
In the take or pay cases, almost every court held buyers to their
contracts.98 Witness the desperate act of the Columbia Gas Pipeline
Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller who complies with para-
graphs (b) and (c) is not a breach of his duty under a contract for sale if performance as
agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence
of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made or by compliance in good
faith with any applicable foreign or domestic governmental regulation or order whether or
not it later proves to be invalid. (emphasis added).
96. For cases in various circumstances where the defense of impracticability was ineffec-
tive, see Arabian Score v. Lasma Arabian Ltd., 814 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1987) (death is a fore-
seeable risk when purchasing a horse); United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674 (2d
Cir. 1966) (engineering difficulties); General Motors Corp. v. Paramount Metal Prods. Co.,
90 F. Supp. 2d 861 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (seller of automobile frames not excused where per-
formance would bankrupt the seller); Power Eng'g & Mfg., Ltd. v. Krug Intern., 501 N.W.2d
490 (Iowa 1993) (1993 embargo of Iraq); Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 583
S.W.2d 721 (Mo.App. 1979) (profitability immaterial for obligations under long-term coal
contract); and Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Hoffman-La Roche Chem. Works, 178 A.D. 855, 166
N.Y.S. 179 (N.Y.A.D. 1917) (delivery of chemicals after World War I broke out). Cf
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 758 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1985) (excused
from refusal of delivery of military aircraft parts to Iran after the 1979 revolution, pursuant
to Air Force order).
97. Marcovich Land Co. v. J. J. Newberry Co., 413 N.E.2d 935, 943 (Ind. App. 1980).
This Indiana court was flatly derisive of the Alcoa court's "purported" interpretation of In-
diana doctrine of impracticability. Id.
98. See PGC Pipeline v. Louisiana Intrastate Gas, 791 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1986); Sabine
Corp. v. ONG Western, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 1157 (W.D. Okla. 1989) (where government
regulation permitted, but did not require, reduced production, it did not render the producer
unable to meet contract: no impracticability); Universal Res. Corp. v. Panhandle E. Pipeline
Co., No. CA3-85-0723-R (N.D. Tex. Apr. 1, 1986), affd, 813 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1987); Koch
Indus., Inc. v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., No. 83-990-A, slip op. at 11 (M.D. La. Mar.
14, 1985); Sid Richardson Carbon & Gasoline Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 497, 500
(N.D. Tex. 1984); N. Illinois Gas Co. v. Energy Co-op., Inc., 461 N.E.2d 1049 (Ill. App.
1984); Golsen v. ONG Western, Inc., 756 P.2d 1209 (Okla. 1988). The contracts from which
buyers were released contained force majeure clauses. See Rodrick J. Coffey, Fairness Is In
The Eye Of The Beholder: The Conflicting Interpretations Of The Correct Measure Of Dam-
ages For Breaches Of Natural Gas Contracts Containing Take-Or-Pay Provisions, 14 BYU J.
PUB. L. 151 (1999); John Burritt McArthur, The Take-Or-Pay Crisis: Diagnosis, Treatment,
and Cure for Immorality in the Marketplace, 22 N.M. L. REV. 353 (1992); J. Michael Medina,
The Take-Or-Pay Wars: A Cautionary Analysis for the Future, 27 TULSA L.J. 283 (1991);
A.F. Brooke, Note, Great Expectations: Assessing the Contract Damages of the Take-or-Pay
Producer, 70 TEXAS L. REV. 1469, 1478 (1992); Ryan E. Griffitts, Comment, Roye Realty &
Developing, Inc. v. Arkla, Inc.: Two Steps Forward and Two Steps Back in the Take-or-Pay
Saga, 20 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 219, 234-35 (1996); Marc Ryan Stimpert, Note, Lenape
Resources Corporation v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company: Natural Gas Take-Or-Pay
Contracts Under The Uniform Commercial Code, 18 ENERGY L.J. 421 (1997). But see Atlan-
tic Richfield Co. v. ANR Pipeline Co., 768 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. App 1989) (relieving pipeline
Jack Dawson
that threw itself into chapter 11 because it could find no other way to
avoid several thousand losing contracts to buy gas at above market
prices.99 Buyers of coal fared no better than the buyers of gas. They
too were made to pay above market prices when their sellers' clever
contracts caused the contract prices to rise far above spot prices." ° The
same holds true for leases and other miscellaneous contracts. 1
There is no evidence in the cases of the last two decades that the
courts have become more receptive to pleas of mistake or supervening
changes."2 If anything, the lessons of the game theorists may be sink-
ing in. We now appreciate more than before that parties at the time of
contracting and later will respond to the events considered here. The
manifold shocks to the commodities market since 1960 are now known
to every negotiator of a long-term commodity contract. That the
courts have not welcomed pleas for avoidance must also be known to
these negotiators. With this knowledge any sensible negotiator should
reexamine his behavior. Some may eschew long-term contracts 3 in
the gas market, for it is only the long-term that makes price diversions
large and unbearable. Others may be more careful or not as greedy in
negotiating escalation clauses." And, of course, careful students of the
company of take-or-pay obligations under force majeure clause where customers (MichCon)
were released from obligations by FERC Order 380).
99. In re Columbia Gas Sys., Inc., 997 F.2d 1039 (3rd Cir. 1993); In re Columbia Gas
Sys., Inc., 133 B.R. 174 (Bankr. D. Del. 1991) (concerning an unsecured creditor's motion to
be put on unsecured creditor committee). Columbia evidently did not include "market-out"
provisions in its contracts which permit a renegotiation of price terms if gas cannot be resold
at marketable rates. See Office of Consumers' Counsel v. F.E.R.C., 783 F.2d 206, 216 n.20
(D.C. Cir. 1986).
100. See, e.g., Kentucky Utils. Co. v. S.E. Coal Co., 836 S.W.2d 392 (Ky. 1992) (finding
that U.C.C. provision excusing seller from performance when performance has become
commercially impracticable because of unforeseen circumstances did not apply to long-term
coal supply contract, where contract contained price review provision permitting readjust-
ment of coal price). See generally Steven Walt, Expectations, Loss Distribution, and Com-
mercial Impracticability, 24 IND. L. REV. 65 (1990).
101. For a discussion of impossibility as applied in leases, see Nicholas R. Weiskopf,
Frustration of Contractual Purpose - Doctrine or Myth?, 70 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 239, 252-55
(1996).
102. Marcovich Land Co. v. J. J. Newberry Co., 413 N.E.2d 935 (Ind. App. 1980) (de-
clining to excuse landlord from rebuilding commercial building destroyed in fire merely be-
cause financing was unavailable).
103. Fereidun Fesharaki & Robert R. Smith, Environmental Concern To Stimulate Asia-
Pacific LNG Use, OIL & GAS J., July 16, 2001, at 68 (observing that gas contracts must be of
shorter duration and take-or-pay clauses must allow greater latitude for LNG to remain
competitive with coal and oil).
104. Amy R. Templeton, Prudence Of Electric Utilities' Coal Contracts and Fuel Pro-
curement Practices: The Impact On Coal Contract Negotiations, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 715
(1987) (assessing the impact of agency oversight on coal utility contracts with suppliers).
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cases might even learn about the kinds of clauses that work and those
that do not.105
Judges' familiarity with the waves of volatility that first roiled the
uranium, then the oil, and later the gas, coal and electricity markets, in
order, has made them progressively more skeptical about parties'
claims of cataclysm. Better than before, the courts appreciate that any
judicial outcome - whether it is avoidance or refusal to avoid - is
more likely to be followed by renegotiation of the contract than by
ruin or bankruptcy. If the contract still makes sense for the parties,
they are likely to continue even after a court rules for one or the other.
That ruling will affect the form of the renegotiation (with the winner
in court getting a larger share of the surplus from the contract), but ju-
dicial modification of the contract is not necessary for the parties to
carry on.
In these cases we see just a hint that the courts are getting harder,
not softer, that they are more, not less, likely to leave the parties in
their contract than formerly." 6 Whether this phenomenon is because
of the writing of people like Jack Dawson, because the most promi-
nent cases have led the way, or because the courts believe the econo-
mists, we don't know, but we see no weakening of the judicial spine.
Jack, of course, was concerned principally with the court's remedy
in Alcoa, not with that or any other court's conclusion about the pres-
ence of mistake, impracticability or the like. But the issues are insepa-
rable; since no offending remedy can be imposed without a finding of
mistake, impracticability or the like, the courts' attitude about the lat-
ter are bound to the former. No impracticability, mistake or frustra-
tion - no basis to rewrite the contract.
105. Industries whose rates must be approved (or are subject to review) by regulatory
entities must take added care. See Pennzoil Co. v. F.E.R.C., 645 F.2d 360, 378 (5th Cir. 1981)
(holding that indefinite escalator clauses are prohibited under National Gas Act); South-
western Elec. Power Co. v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 475 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Tex. 1979) (In-
terstate Commerce Commission regarding railroad fees); In re Application of Delmarva
Power & Light Co., 486 A.2d 19 (Del. Super. 1984), rev'd, Delmarva Power & Light Co. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 508 A.2d 849 (Del. 1986) (trial court upheld utility commission's refusal
to allow price increases under escalator clause new to the coal industry, which was therefore
"imprudent" without a price cap; reversed and remanded regarding applicable standard).
106. See R. S. Trigg, Escalator Clauses In Public Utility Rate Schedules, 106 U. PA. L.
REV. 964 (1958). This article precedes the 1970s energy crisis and reflects the thinking un-
derlying the clauses that were so heavily litigated a decade later. See also Crump, supra note
77; Templeton, supra note 104; William F. Treanor & Raymond W. Goldfaden, Challenges
To Rent Escalation Clauses In Commercial Leases, PROB. & PROP., May/June 1990, at 6.
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C. Modifying Contracts
Whatever the wisdom of letting Alcoa escape the letter of its con-
tract and whatever the propriety of using "mistake" as the theory, 7
the revolutionary part of the Alcoa decision was Judge Teitelbaum's
rewriting the contract price formula to give Alcoa a small profit per
pound. That was the act that made Jack apoplectic, that attracted the
academic writers1" and that put Alcoa into most of the contracts case-
books."9
We have found no case that follows Alcoa. Two judges, one con-
curring in a West Virginia Supreme Court case and one a Federal
magistrate judge in New Jersey, embrace the rule.Y° In Unihealth v.
107. See generally Clayton Gillette, Commercial Rationality and the Duty to Adjust
Long-Term Contracts, 69 MINN. L. REV. 521 (1985) (criticizing those commentators who
urge courts to rewrite contracts); Medina et al., supra note 89.
108. See generally Robert A. Hillman, Court Adjustment Of Long-Term Contracts: An
Analysis Under Modern Contract Law, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1, 225 (identifying two situations
calling for adjustment: an "agreement model" that accounts for the "relational" realities of
many contract settings through a theory of the parties' implicit risk allocation; and the "gap
model," which is based primarily on the fairness principle that the parties should agree to
share unallocated losses); Subha Narasimhan, Of Expectations, Incomplete Contracting, And
The Bargain Principle, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1123, 1193 et seq. (1986); Richard Speidel, Court-
Imposed Price Adjustments Under Long-Term Supply Contracts, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 369
(1981); Zundel, supra note 73.
109. Alcoa's first appearance was in E. Allan Farnsworth's 1980 Contracts casebook,
3rd. ed. Our incomplete survey has shown that most casebooks cover Alcoa, and they show
few signs of slowing down. The results below indicate which books do and do not include
Alcoa:
Not included: JOHN D. CALAMARI, JOSEPH M. PERILLO, HELEN HADJIYANNAKIS
BENDER, CASES AND PROBLEMS ON CONTRACTS (2nd ed. 1989); JOHN P. DAWSON,
WILLIAM BURNETr HARVEY, & STANLEY D. HENDERSON, CASES AND COMMENT ON
CONTRACTS (4th ed. 1982); LON L. FULLER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC
CONTRACT LAW (4th ed. 1981); JOHN H. JACKSON & LEE C. BOLLINGER, CONTRACT LAW
IN MODERN SOCIETY: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1980); FRIEDRICH KESSLER, GRANT
GILMORE, & ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (3rd ed.
1986); JOHN W. WHELAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTS (1985).
Included: E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM F. YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CONTRACTS (3d-Sth eds. 1980, 1988, 1995); LON L. FULLER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG,
BASIC CONTRACT LAW (5th-6th eds. 1990, 1996); ROBERT W. HAMILTON, ALAN SCOTr
RAU, & RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS (1984) (in-
cluding nine pages of edited cases plus some glowing commentary); CHARLES L. KNAPP &
NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, (2d-4th
eds. 1987, 1993, 1999); ADDISON MUELLER, ARTHUR ROSETr & GERALD P. LOPEZ,
CONTRACT LAW AND ITS APPLICATION (3d ed. 1983) (including seventeen pages of edited
case); EDWARD J. MURPHY & RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW (3d-4th
eds. 1984, 1991); JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed.
2000); ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED
OBLIGATION: THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE (1987).
110. A few others have sympathetic dicta. See, e.g., Freidco, Ltd. v. Farmers Bank of
Del., 529 F. Supp. 822, 830 n.9 (D. Del. 1981); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 517 F. Supp. 440, 458 (E.D. Va. 1981); Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Atlas
Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129, 135-36 (N.D. Iowa 1978), rev'd, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 911 (1980); McGinnis v. Cayton, 312 S.E.2d 765,779-81 (W. Va. 1984).
Michigan Law Review
U.S. Healthcare,"' Magistrate Judge Pisano had to resolve a contract
dispute between a hospital and an HMO that had agreed to send its
members to the hospital in return a reduction in the hospital's normal
fees. Normally, the hospital charged patients according to a flat fee
that corresponded to the patient's condition, the patient's "Diagnostic
Group" ("DRG"). The DRG provided a flat rate for a service whether
the patient required a longer or a shorter stay in the hospital than av-
erage or whether the patient required more or less service than the av-
erage person with that particular condition or need for treatment. In-
stead of DRG payments, the HMO bargained for per diem payments.
Both the hospital and the HMO believed the per diem payments
would be smaller than the DRG billing would be. To protect against
an excessive reduction in the payments that it would receive, the hos-
pital bargained for a restriction on the discount that would be enjoyed
by the HMO. That clause read as follows: "If the overall discount for
all Inpatients exceeds 40% ... U.S. Healthcare will reimburse [hospi-
tal] monies beyond the 40% discount .... 
112
The parties interpreted the "discount" to mean the difference be-
tween the DRG charge and the per diem charge for the same service
that was provided in the contract. In 1993 New Jersey abolished the
DRG system; that left the discount formula without a minuend from
which to subtract the actual per diem charge of the HMO. 113 Using its
"normal revenue" charge, in lieu of the DRG charges for 1993, the
hospital claimed the HMO owed an adjustment of more than $500,000
because the "discount" had exceeded 40% by that amount.14 Of
course, the higher the normal charges or revenues, the larger the ex-
cess of 40%.
Finding that the circumstances fit within Section 265 of the Second
Restatement of Contracts on Supervening Frustration, the court con-
cludes that "neither party should be subject to the harsh results pro-
posed by the other party, since neither assumed the risk of the repeal
[of the DRGs]. ''" 5 Seeking a remedy, the court cites Judge
Teitelbaum's holding that "the appropriate remedy in a case involving
a frustrated contract was to modify the contractual price term.
16
Magistrate Pisano also asserts that his case falls "snugly within the
ambit of Sections 204 and 272 of the Restatement.""1
7
111. 14 F. Supp. 2d 623 (D. N.J. 1998).
112. Id. at 626.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 627.
115. Id. at 632.
116. Id. at 638.
117. Id. at 640.
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The court then exhorts the parties to negotiate a settlement and
appoints a master to determine the reasonable value of the hospital's
service in 1993 to be used if the parties fail to agree on a number for
that year.'18
Despite this warm embrace of Alcoa, this is not in any sense an
Alcoa case. First, as the court notes, the case would be perfect for ap-
plying Section 2-305 of the UCC by analogy. That section directs a
court to apply a "reasonable price" where "the price is to be fixed in
terms of some agreed market or other standard as set or recorded by a
third person or agency and it is not so set or recorded."'1 9 This is only
the familiar case of a failed formula. Indeed the court's finding of frus-
tration is unnecessary to the conclusion that the price should now be a
reasonable price.
The case differs from Alcoa in a second important way. Here the
parties had performed and the plaintiff was merely asking for an inter-
pretation of the contract that the defendant owed $500,000. Since the
contract had expired, neither party needed rules to govern continued
future performance of the contract.
The needless commentary on frustration and Alcoa removed,
Unihealth is a thoroughly conventional case where a judge must decide
what a contract means and whether the plaintiff has proved its case.
For these reasons it does not bear Alcoa's genes.
Like Unihealth, McGinnis v. Clayton2 ' has a lot of Alcoa talk, but
no Alcoa holding. In McGinnis, the plaintiffs were the successors to a
West Virginia landowner who leased his oil and gas in 1893. The lease
required the lessee to pay a one eighth royalty on oil but gave the les-
see the right to gas for $100 per year, which in 1893 had no commercial
value.'2' When a deepened well began to produce commercial quanti-
ties of gas in 1978, the lessor's successors sued to void the lease on the
ground that it was no longer "commercially reasonable." '122 The lower
court dismissed and the Supreme Court reversed.
Noting the possibility that the plaintiffs might bring themselves
within the rule of a 19th century case that avoided a ninety-nine year
lease for timber and coal because the parties had been mutually mis-
taken about the presence of mineable coal on the property, the major-
ity reversed the lower court's dismissal.'23 The higher court was par-
ticularly careful to make no finding about the continued vitality of the
118. Id. at 641-42.
119. Id. at 639 n.24.
120. 312 S.E.2d 765, 780 (W.Va. 1984).
121. Id. at 767.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 770.
June 20021 1975
Michigan Law Review
mutual mistake doctrine in such a case and took pains to explain that it
was merely giving the plaintiffs a chance to establish a "record".
The indorsement of Alcoa comes from concurring Justice
Harshbarger. 24 Criticizing the "limited scope" of the majority opinion,
Justice Harshbarger ranges widely over commercial impracticability,
supervening events, unjust enrichment, and even unconscionability.
Citing articles by Professors Macneil and Speidel, Justice Harshbarger
suggests that Alcoa is merely a form of "equitable adjustment [that] is
itself an evolved form of 'reformation.' "'25 At least implying that he
would use the Alcoa theory to change the gas royalty, the Justice rea-
sons that Alcoa's "rationale is useful when applied to a contract such
as the McGuinnises'. "126
Notwithstanding its elegance and wide range, Justice
Harshbarger's opinion remains only a concurring opinion. Moreover,
it concurs with a majority opinion that is far from encouraging for the
plaintiffs. The majority offers only the smallest hope to the plaintiff:
"[An appellate court's decision to overturn the granting of a [motion
for summary judgment] does not reflect an opinion on the ultimate
merits of the case." '127 The majority even casts doubt on the court's
own nineteenth century opinion on which the plaintiffs rely:
Although appellants are entitled to a hearing, to prevail they must estab-
lish mutual mistake as a legally sufficient ground for rescission or refor-
mation of the contract. It is true that in Bluestone Coal, supra we stated
that, "Nothing is more clear than the doctrine that a contract founded in
a mutual mistake of the facts constituting the very basis or essence of it
will avoid it"... . Nevertheless, this Court has not had occasion to ad-
dress the mutual mistake question in some time, and we note that the
doctrine has been applied in disparate ways in other jurisdictions... we
content ourselves with ruling that appellant's allegations raise a poten-
tially meritorious argument ... 128
A careful listener to the majority opinion might hear the court saying:
"Dismissal is the right outcome, but you have to give the fellow a
hearing first."
Some of the judicial critics of Alcoa have been explicit about their
disagreement. In Printing Industries Association v. International
Printing and Graphic Communications Union,129 Judge Battisti states
that he is "at odds with the reasoning and result in ALCOA .... The
willingness of courts to reform contracts on the basis of subsequent
124. Id.
125. Id. at 779 (internal quotation omitted).
126. Id. at 780.
127. Id. at 768.
128. Id. at 770 (citing Bluestone Coal Co. v. Bell, 18 S.E. 493 (1893)).
129. 584 F. Supp. 990 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
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knowledge may undermine the policy of finality which is so essential
and revered in the contract law.,
130
In Wabash v. Avnet, T' Judge Shadur speaks to Jack Dawson's con-
cern "[u]nder the logical consequences of that case there would be no
predictability or certainty for contracting parties who selected a future
variable to measure their contract liability. Whichever way the vari-
able fluctuated, the disappointed party would be free to assert frus-
trated expectations and seek relief via reformation." '132 A handful of
other cases content themselves with distinguishing Alcoa. Most of
those do not address the rewriting; they deal with the finding of mis-
take.
After only seven years one writer found that Alcoa had "virtually
faded into obscurity.. ,,."" I suspect that the only thing that keeps
Alcoa on stage is its presence in some of the current casebooks. It re-
mains a favorite of contracts casebook writers; in casebooks the em-
bers often linger long after the fire has subsided elsewhere.
IV. CONCLUSION
Jack Dawson's worry that Alcoa was the first of many steps down
the path followed by the Germans was wrong, but why? Why have the
American courts not followed the Germans? Our judiciary is a conser-
vative institution - but surely not more so than the German judiciary.
Let us try two hypotheses.
First the Germans may be the victims of listening too well to
Santayana. Remember, "[t]hose who cannot remember the past are
condemned to repeat it." 34 One corollary to that rule is that those who
remember the past too well may become its prisoners. As Jack pointed
out in Oracles of the Law, judicial creativity is a necessity if the law is
to retain its vitality; judges must recognize and respond to changing
circumstances. Just as armies fight the previous war, Central Banks
sometimes do what worked in the previous recession, and businesses
revert to strategies that worked the last time. In retrospect, these calls
130. Id. at 998.
131. 516 F. Supp. 995 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
132. Id. at 999 n.5; see also Golsen v. ONG Western, Inc., 756 P.2d 1209, 1223 (Okla.
1988) (Kauger, J., concurring) (disfavoring Alcoa's "expansive" view of impracticability over
UCC 2-615).
133. Sheldon W. Halpern, Application Of The Doctrine Of Commercial Impracticability:
Searching For 'The Wisdom Of Solomon', 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1123, 1127 (1987); see also
United States v. Southwestern Elec. Co-op., Inc., 869 F.2d 310, 315 n.7 (7th Cir. 1989) (de-
fendant tried to rescind on mutual mistake a twenty-five year requirement contract for elec-
tricity b  arguing that the actual costs for nuclear power plant construction, which deter-
mined electricity price, were ten times greater than estimated costs).




on history are often found to be misguided because the later circum-
stances differ from the earlier.
That might also be true of the German judiciary, many of whom
must have had personal recollections of the 1920s and 1930s. German
courts' revalorizing and other modification of contracts with and with-
out legislative authority during the hyperinflation after the First War
was a living precedent. Even Jack Dawson acknowledges that behav-
ior in those circumstances to have been necessary and appropriate.
13
1
But the courts of the 1950s ignored the corollary; they applied the les-
son of yesterday (1924) to the present (1950) and, at least according to
Jack, made a bad mistake.
The American courts have been saved from violating Santayana's
corollary not because they are smarter or more insightful students of
history than the Germans, but because of their ignorance of and re-
moteness from comparable American social and legal history. As
Dawson's very first publication in this Review shows, both Southern
and Northern courts revalorized land and otherwise rewrote contracts
immediately after the Civil War when contracts made in Confederate
currency had to be adjusted first for the decline in that currency's
value and then for its abolition)36 Even if the post Civil War history
were well known, it would not have had as powerful an effect on the
American courts as the much more recent experience had on the
Germans.'37 So perhaps we have been saved from the Germans' fate
both by our disregard for history and by the remoteness of events.
There is a second hypothesis that might explain American courts'
refusal to rewrite contracts in cases where the Germans would do so.
Perhaps our shocks - shortages of oil, gas and the like - are of a dif-
ferent magnitude than those that hit Europe in the twentieth cen-
tury.138 Commodity shortages are one thing, fighting across one's soil
as the French, Russians, Germans and others did, and suffering the
bombing that was experienced by the British and the much of Europe,
is something else. If either of the World Wars had been fought on
American soil, the stress on our economy would have far exceeded
135. See Dawson, Judicial Revision in Germany, supra note 57.
136. See Dawson, Effects of Inflation in the United States, supra note 9. For a discussion
of the impact of the Civil War on American society, see JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE
CRY OF FREEDOM 1-46, 853-62 (1988) (noting the state of American culture in the mid-
nineteenth century and observing the transformation of the United States during the war
from an agrarian, pre-industrial value system to a modern, industrial society).
137. Unlike the First World War, which left an already industrialized Germany reeling
from out-of-control inflation, the Civil War galvanized American industry and had a number
of (arguably) salutary effects on economic management. See generally MCPHERSON, supra
note 136, at 428-53.
138. Dawson hints at this in Judicial Revision of Frustrated Contracts: Germany, noting
that the German courts did not consider the impact of the OPEC embargo of 1972-73 suffi-
cient to frustrate performance of contracts. Dawson, Judicial Revision in Germany, supra
note 57, at 1081.
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that imposed by rising oil prices. 39 Having been spared from fighting
on our own soil since 1865, we should be slow to claim superiority for
our legal doctrine. Had either of the Wars been fought here, we too
might have had a recent precedent for appropriate contract rewriting
that our courts might have extended to inappropriate cases.
For the time being, the threat to freedom of contract that Jack saw
in Alcoa has receded. No courts have followed its holding and only a
few judges have embraced its reasoning. Even in the law schools it
may be losing its hold. 4' Though ignorance may on occasion save us
from mechanical application of the lessons of history, it does not ex-
cuse willful ignorance of our legal heritage. If we choose, despite
Jack's admonitions, to ignore the lesson of Alcoa, we cannot be too
confident that future, stronger shocks might not resurrect it.
This Article ventures some of our tentative hypotheses about the
development of the law of frustration in the United States. Were Jack
Dawson still with us, he undoubtedly could bring to bear his legal ex-
pertise, depth of historical knowledge, and insight into the vagaries of
the human condition. His writing is a testament to hard work and the
wisdom born of experience over a six-decade career. If these hypothe-
ses need further refinement, we can imagine no better way to start the
process than talking to Jack Dawson over a drink of whisky on a
Sunday morning.
139. Those old enough to recall might remember former President Jimmy Carter's don-
ning a cardigan, turning down the thermostat in the White House, and declaring the energy
crisis the "moral equivalent of war." Sadly for Carter, this declaration failed to steel the re-
solve of the American people in the same way that Roosevelt's description of Pearl Harbor
as a "date which will live in infamy" did.
140. See supra note 109 (surveying textbooks).
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